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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALLACE R. SMITH, dba SMITH 
REALTY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
C. TAYLOR BURTON, 
Defendant ·and Respondent 
Case No. 8302 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS 
APPELLANT ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This Brief is filed in reply to the Petition for 
Rehearing and Brief In Support Thereof, filed by 
plaintiff and in opposition thereto. 
Throughout this Brief, appellant will be re-
ferred to as plaintiff, and respondent and cross ap-
pellant will be referred to as defendant. All italics 
are ours. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the interest of brevity, defendant respect-
fully refers the court to the Statement of Facts set 
forth in his original brief in this matter, for a full 
recital of the facts involved in this case. 
POINTS RELIED UPON. 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT HAS CORRECTLY APPLIED 
AND CONSTRUED THE PAROL EVIDENCE 
RULE IN THIS CASE, IN REVERSING THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT AWARD-
ING PLAINTIFF A $2,000.00 JUDGMENT 
AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
ARGUMENT POINT I. 
Plaintiff charges that this court has fallen into 
error in considering the parol evidence rule as a rule 
of evidence, instead of a rule of substantive law, 
and implies that the court was unfamiliar with the 
Utah case of Farr vs. Wasatch Chemical Company, 
105 Utah 272, 143 P. 2d, 281. 
We assert that this court was dead right in this 
matter and that its decision is in entire harmony 
with the holding in the Farr case. It is hard to 
understand how plaintiff can get such comfort out 
of the Farr decision, since it in no way supports his 
theory in this matter. The Farr case and the case 
at bar are clearly distinguishable on the facts, and 
the law enunciated in the Farr case only fortifies 
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this court in its decision in this case. It is there 
held "The principle that parol evidence is not ad-
missable to contradict, add to, or vary the terms of 
a written contract. The rule is, of course, well 
established, but, it has no application here. * * * 
Here the alleged oral agreement does not in any way 
attempt to vary or contradict the terms of the writ-
ten agreement." The court then pointed out that 
the lease in the Farr case did not purport to deal, 
in any way, with the matter of making the premises 
ready for occupancy, but only had to do with the, 
rental and care of the premises after occupancy. It 
allowed oral evidence regarding the agreement of 
the landlord to make repairs before the tenant took 
over, but it rejected oral testimony regarding an 
elevator, since the agreement required the tenant 
to keep the premises in repair after occupancy, and 
the court held that "if a particular element of an 
alleged extrinsic negotiation is dealt with at all in 
a writing, presumably the writing was meant to 
represent all of the transaction on that element, and 
parol evidence is inadmissible thereon." 
In the Farr case there was no mention, what-
ever, in the lease, of the matter as to which parol 
evidence was admitted. It was an entirely different 
matter, not expressly nor impliedly covered by the 
writing. We have no fault with that holding on the 
facts involved. 
But our case is something else again. We have 
our subject covered in Exhibit 7 namely, a commis-
sion to be paid plaintiff. It is an integrated agree-
ment, complete, clear and unambiguous.· Within its 
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four corners are found the entire agreement of the 
parties on the subject covered. It was entered into 
by two experienced business men of more than ordi-
nary intelligence. Smith, especially, is a veteran 
real estate salesman, accustomed to making all sorts 
of unusual commission agreements, according to 
his own testimony. He testified that defendant had 
no money and would only agree to the Toone ex-
change on the basis of the commission agreement 
set forth in Exhibit 7. Plaintiff very much wanted 
to get a deed to his duplex, which he could do only 
when the remaining two duplexes were disposed of 
and he felt sure he could rent the pasture. He had 
plenty of reason and motive to enter into this con-
tingent fee agreement. For a more full discussion 
of this being a contingent fee agreement, and for 
authorities supporting such view, the court is re-
spectfully referred to Point I of Defendant's Original 
Brief, beginning at page 7. 
Plaintiff states that Exhibit 7 does not cover the 
contingency which arose, i.e.: That enough money 
was not received to pay plaintiff $2,000.00 commis-
sion. We can't think he is serious in this contention. 
Plaintiff was entitled only to such commission, if any, 
as might be affirmatively agreed upon. They ap-
proached this subject affirmatively by saying that 
"as my commission * * * I will take one-half of the 
rental fee * * *." Now it was not necessary to go 
on and state negatively, in substance, "But if no rent 
is received, I will get no commission." The law im-
plies this negative result. In other words, plaintiff 
started with no rights to commission from defendant 
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and became entitled thereto only to the extent pro-
vided in this special agreement, and that consisted 
of one-half of the 1953 rent. There was no rent, 
hence no commission became due. 
Counsel for plaintiff is a man of great experi-
ence at the bar, and I feel certain that in contingent 
fee agreements he has drawn, he has approached 
the rna tter in the same manner as was done in this 
case, i.e.: By stating affirmatively what contingent 
fee is to be, how payable, etc., but has not gone on 
to state negatively that if he makes no recovery, he 
is to get no fee. At least that is my practice and 
that of many others I know. The thing I am amazed 
at is that two laymen could, in so few words, write 
such a clear and complete agreement, leaving noth-
ing in doubt. 
On what subject does plaintiff endeavor to have 
parol evidence considered? Obviously, on the sub-
ject of the commission due him. Yet, isn't this the 
very subject treated in Exhibit 7? Is it a distinct, 
different or collateral matter? Clearly not! Does 
plaintiff contend that the thing he seeks to prove by 
parol evidence would not contradict, add to or vary 
the terms of a written instrument, which the Farr 
case, supra, says may not be done? Of course not. 
As this court so well says. It is the very "antithesis 
of the plain terms of the memorandum," Exhibit 7. 
The whole heart, meaning and substance of Exhibit 
7 would be destroyed. So far as we are aware, the 
decisions are unanimous that this cannot be done. 
The court has no power to write a new contract for 
the parties, and will not permit parol evidence to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
destroy the plain, clear agreement of the parties, 
embodied in writing. At 12 Am. Juris. 7 49, it is 
thus stated : 
"Interpretation of an agreement does not 
include its modification or the creation of a 
new or different one. A court is not at liberty 
to revise an agreement while professing to 
construe it. Nor does it have the right to 
make a construction for the parties." 
Whether the parol evidence rule be considered 
one of evidence or of substantive law, all courts 
would reject the offer of plaintiff's parol evidence 
in this case, since it would completely alter a written 
instrument, which speaks on the same subject and 
which obviously was intended as the agreement of 
the parties. The courts have said that if parol evi-
dence is conditionally admitted to show the condi-
tions surrounding the making of a written instru-
ment, and, is found to vary, modify or add to the 
terms of the writing on the same rna tter, such parol 
evidence will be rejected. That, certainly is the case 
here. 
In Fox Film Corporation vs. Ogden Theatre 
Company, 17 Pac. (2d) 294, 90 A.L.R. 1299, the 
court has said : 
"In the absence of fraud, or mistake, parol 
evidence is not admissable to contradict, 
vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of a 
valid written instrument which purports to 
set forth the entire contract of the parties." 
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To the same general effect see 20 Am. Juris. 958, 
963, 968, 989, 990, 991 and 12 Am. Juris. 755, 756, 
757, and 758. At page 991 of 20 Am. Juris. is the 
following: 
"A written agreement dealing with the 
amount, time and manner of payment is 
ordinarily conclusively to be presumed to em-
body all that element of the oral negotiation." 
At 12 Am. Juris. 758, is the following: 
"A written contract may properly be 
varied by an oral agreement only when it is 
collateral, is not inconsistent with express or 
implied conditions of the written contract, 
and is one which the parties could not rea-
sonably be expected to embody in the writ-
ing." 
Can it be said in this case that plaintiff's offered 
oral agreement is collateral to the written one and 
that it is not inconsistent with the expressed and 
implied conditions thereof and that it is one which 
the parties could not reasonably be expected to have 
embodied in the writing? The answer is "no" to 
each proposition. 
One of the best discussions of this whole sub-
ject is found in 70 A.L.R. beginning at page 752, 
where an array of cases from all jurisdictions is as-
sembled. 
"To allow a party to lay the foundation 
for oral evidence by oral testimony that only 
part of the agreement was reduced to writing, 
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and then prove by parol the part omitted 
would be to work in a circle and to permit the 
very evil which the rule was designed to pre-
vent." Thompson vs. Libby, 34 Minn. 37 4; 26 
N.W .. l. 
Bearing on the argument of plaintiff that the 
drawing of Exhibit 8 by plaintiff is evidence of in-
tent of the parties and should be admitted in evi-
dence, we find in Fentriss vs. Steele, 110 Va. 578; 
66 S.E. 870, that the court says that parol evidence 
cannot be admitted to prove a contemporaneous 
agreement that a written instrument, on its face 
unambiguous and complete, should be considered 
only as a basis or outline of a contract to be filled 
out subsequently with stipulations other than those 
stated in the writing. 
In Dawson County State Bank vs. Durland, 114 
Neb. 605; 209 N.W. 243, the court adopts the doc-
trine that 
"The test of the completeness of a written 
contract is the writing itself and parol evi-
dence to show that it is incomplete is not 
competent." 
At 70 A.L.R. 759, we find the following: In the 
New York court in a comparatively recent case 
(Mitchell vs. Lath, 160 N.E. 646; 68 A.L.R. 239) 
the court has laid down these conditions which, it 
is said, must exist before an oral agreement may be 
shown to vary the written contract, viz: (1) the 
oral agreement must be in form a collateral one; 
( 2) it must not contradict express or implied provi-
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sions of the written contract; ( 3) it must be one 
that parties would not ordinarily be expected to em-
body in the writing. See also 12 Am. Juris 758. 
Plaintiff in our case not only fails to meet all 
three of these requirements, but actually meets not 
a single one of them. 
To the same general effect see the pronounce-
ment of the U.S. Supreme Court in Seitz v. Brewers' 
Refrigerating Machinery Company, 141 U.S. 510; 
35 L. Ed. 837, where a written contract is silent 
as to a particular matter (in this case time of pay-
ment), and the law supplies the omission, parol evi-
dence is not admissable to show a particular date 
for payment alleged to have been agreed upon, since 
this would be to vary the written contract. Cliver 
v. Heil, 95 Wis. 364; 70 N.W. 346. 
In his second ground for a rehearing, plaintiff 
cries out loudly that the decision "deprives plaintiff, 
without any justification of commission which in 
equity and good conscience were due him and in ef-
fect creates a penalty and forfeiture." 
One can suffer a forfeiture only of something 
one has or is legally entitled to. In this case we have 
conclusively shown that plaintiff did not become en-
ti tied to any commission, because he was to be paid 
only if he rented the pastures, which he failed to do. 
The simple fact is, the contingency which would en-
title him to a commission never occurred and he just 
didn't qualify for a commission. How then can he 
accuse this court of depriving him without justifica-
tion of commissions or of levying a penalty? Does 
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counsel feel that in an accident case which he has 
on a contingent fee basis, that he has been deprived 
without justification of a fee, because he does not 
win his case? Nothing was due plaintiff "in equity 
and good conscience" unless he became entitled 
legally to a commission, and this court has rightly 
decided that he is not so entitled. 
This court has not misconstrued or ignored the 
parol evidence rule or its proper application to this 
case, as charged by plaintiff, but, on the contrary, 
has properly applied said rule, as announced, in the 
Farr case, supra, and other leading authorities, and 
in so doing has concluded that whether it be a rule 
of evidence or of substantive law still the admission 
of the parol evidence to sustain the finding of the 
lower court would add to, vary and modify the terms 
of a written agreement, Exhibit 7, and is so incon-
sistent therewith, that such parol evidence cannot 
be received under the most liberal construction of 
said agreement. Therefore the decision reversing 
the judgment of the lower court is right and proper. 
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POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR A COMMISSION 
IS VOID UNDER OUR STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 
UNLESS HE CAN BRING IT UNDER THE 
WRITrrEN AGREEMENT, EXHIBIT 7. 
ARGUMENT POINT II. 
As pointed out in defendant's original Brief, 
plaintiff is stopped at the threshold, by the provi-
sions of our Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-4, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, which provides: 
"Every agreement authorizing or em-
ploying an agent or broker to purchase or sell 
real estate for compensation" 
shall be void unless in writing. An earlier statute, 
identical in wording, was construed by this court in 
the case of Case v. Ralph, 188 Pac. 640, as requiring 
that a real estate broker, if he is to recover at all, 
must base his claim on a written instrument cover-
ing all terms of h1s employment, showing his au-
thority to sell, the amount, terms, and consideration 
upon which his commission is to be paid. Under 
that holding plaintiff must recover, if at all, under 
the terms of the written agreement, Exhibit 7, and 
not under the parol agreement which he seeks to 
prove. This salutary statute was passed to prevent 
just such an attempt as is here made to claim a 
broker's commission on flimsy, contradictory, and 
often poorly remembered parol agreements. It ap-
pears that plaintiff is stopped in this case, which-
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ever way he turns. If he stays with the written con-
tract, Exhibit 7, as he must do under the law, then 
he became entitled to no commission and if he at-
tempts, as he is doing, to vary its terms by alleging 
a parol agreement, then he encounters this provision 
of our statute which makes void such parol agree-
ment. 
POINT III. 
NO SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR A RE-
HEARING HAS BEEN SHOWN BY PLAINTIFF 
AND HIS PETITION THEREFORE SHOULD BE 
DENIED. 
ARGUMENT POINT III. 
This court has consistently and repeatedly ruled 
that to justify a rehearing a strong case must be 
made. It is thus stated in Brown v. Pickard, a Utah 
case at 11 Pac. 512: 
"We long ago laid down the rule that to 
justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court 
failed to consider some material point in the 
case, or that it erred in its conclusions or 
that some matter had been discovered which 
was unknown at the time of the hearing. 
* * * When a case has been fully and fairly 
considered, in all its bearings, a rehearing 
will be denied." 
To the same effect: In re MacKnight, 9 Pa. 299. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
It is put thusly in the Utah case of Ducheneau 
vs. House, 11 Pac. 618: 
"We have repeatedly called attention to 
the fact that no rehearing will be granted 
where nothing new or important is offered 
for our consideration. We again say that 
we cannot grant a rehearing unless a strong 
showing therefor is made. A re-argument, 
or an argument with the Court upon the 
points of the decision, with no new light 
given, is not such showing." 
In Cunningham, et al, vis. Scott, et al, 11 Pac. 
619, the court observes: 
"A defeated party usually feels that the 
decision is not good law, but that furnishes 
no ground for a rehearing." 
Judge Frick in the case of Cummings, et ux, vs. 
Nielson, et al, 129 Pac. 619 in writing the opinion 
denying a petition for rehearing stated the disposi-
tion of this court in the following language : 
"When this court, however, has con-
sidered and decided all of the material ques-
tions involved in a case, a rehearing should 
not be applied for, unless we have miscon-
strued or overlooked some material fact or 
facts, or have overlooked some statute or de-
cision which may effect the result, or that 
we have based the decision on some wrong 
principle of law, or have either misapplied or 
overlooked something which materially af-
fects the result. In this case nothing was 
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done or attempted by counsel, except to re-
argue the very propositions we had fully 
considered and decided. If we should write 
opinions on all the petitions for rehearing, 
filed, we should have to devote a very large 
portion of our time in answering counsel's 
contentions a second time ; and if we should 
grant rehearings because they are demanded 
we should do nothing else save to write and 
rewrite opinions in a few cases. Let it again 
be said that it is conceded, as a matter of 
course, that we cannot convince losing coun-
sel that their contentions should not prevail, 
but in making this concession let it also be 
remembered that we, and not counsel, must 
ultimately assume all responsibility with re-
spect to whether our conclusions are sound 
or unsound." 
We submit that plaintiff has presented no new 
points which were not in the original briefs or orally 
argued to the court in the first instance, and that 
all points now raised were considered by the court 
in arriving at its decision. Plaintiff has simply 
charged, with nothing to support it, that the Court's 
decision contains a basic misapplication and mis-
construction of the Parol Evidence Rule. Yet, 
the exact opposite is shown by the Court's decision. 
It points out, in substance, that it has considered the 
finding of the lower court to the effect that in any 
event defendant was to pay plaintiff the commission 
by November 1, 1953, which could be made only on 
the basis of the parol evidence, and finds that such 
finding would so vary the terms of the written agree-
ment, Exhibit 7, that it is inadmissible under the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
parol evidence rule, whether such rule be considered 
as a rule of evidence or as a rule of substantive law. 
This is in line with the undisputed law. 
The only other point made by plaintiff is a re-
statement of his contention, made in his original 
brief, and orally argued to the court, that he should 
be given a judgment because he alleges that the 
fences were not as he would have liked them. This 
court's decision shows that it has considered this 
matter, which it correctly disposes of in this lan-
guage: 
"There was testimony of plaintiff to the 
effect that defendant failed to repair a fence 
so that plaintiff could not rent the pastures. 
Plaint~ff did not plead excuse for non-per-
formance but defendant's hindrance or pre-
vention, asked for no amendment of his 
pleadings to conform to such proof, and the 
lower court obviously was unimpressed with 
such theory since it made no finding to that 
effect. 
How can plaintiff say this court ignored the 
fence question? It clearly did not, but held that 
plaintiffs' pleadings would not support a judgment 
on that theory and that the lower court was so unim-
pressed that it didn't make any sort of finding on it. 
Plaintiff himself placed no importance on this 
theory, because at page 2 of his original brief, he 
states that his claim consists of "Two Thousand 
Dollars was claimed under a memorandum agree-
ment which is marked Exhibit 7 * * * ," and at page 
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4 says "The court found that defendant was in-
debted to plaintiff for the Two Thousand Dollars 
represented by the memorandum contained in Ex-
hibit 7." 
Certainly the lower court's findings are based 
solely on a construction of Exhibit 7 and on the 
further finding that it was the understanding of the 
parties that the commission would be paid in any 
event by November 1st, which latter finding is, we 
submit, without a scintilla of evidence to support it. 
One will search the record in vain for any testimony 
fixing November 1st as a date for payment. The 
court made no finding regarding fences or any ex-
cuse for non-performance by plaintiff and certainly 
no judgment could be supported upon any such 
theory in the absence of any such finding. 
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CONCLUSION. 
It is respectfully submitted that this court pro-
perly applied the parol evidence rule in its decision; 
that plaintiff has failed to show sufficient grounds 
for the granting of his petition for rehearing, and 
that same should be denied, and the decision of this 
court allowed to stand as written. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON ROMNEY and ROMNEY & NELSON 
Counsel for Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
Received three copies of the foregoing Brief 
this __________ day of September, 1955. 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS 
& BLACK and DWIGHT L. KING, 
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